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Michael Dean
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Architect-turned-writer, founder of Essay Architecture. Building pattern languages, software, anthologies, and community for essayists.

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Leisure
Joseph Pieper and James V. Schall
45 highlights
1 response
First: Aug 11, 2026
Last: Oct 29, 2026

Responses (1)

Two types of seeing

August 21, 2026 · 12:53 AM

Our soul is passive and receptive. We are, to be sure, awake and active, but our attention is not strained; we simply “look”—in so far, that is, as we “contemplate” it and are not already “observing” it (for “observing” implies that we are beginning to count, to measure and to weigh up). Observation is a tense activity; which is what Ernst Jünger meant when he called seeing an “act of aggression.” To contemplate, on the other hand, to “look” in this sense, means to open one’s eyes receptively to whatever offers itself to one’s vision, and the things seen enter into us, so to speak, without calling for any effort or strain on our part to possess them. There can hardly be any doubt that that, or something like it, is the way we become sensorially aware of a thing.

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There are many ways of seeing, yet this belittles rational observation.

I resonate with non-optimized receptivity too, a kind of "open perception"—but is discernment really such a sin? The Jünger quote introduces "aggression" as a phrase to slander reason, but actually, there are harsher words: interrogation. There is a mode of seeing where you take a single object, rotate it in every way, try to pick the locks of all the side doors, with the goal of understanding its hidden essence. This is the vision of the scientist, the cartographer, the taxonomist. Can they not have souls?

You can't perceive all of reality all of the time in such a rigorous way (that would be exhausting). There's delight in the mosey of undirected consciousness. Rather, these are two opposite modes: divergence and convergence. Passive attention gives you range, where focused and obsessive attention gives you depth. Without range, you'll fixate your mind on something stupid. Without depth, all your insights will be shallow.

Reason has its pitfalls and limits, but my sense is that post-Enlightenment thinkers have gone too far in trying to dethrone it, creating a schism between the thinkers and feelers. We are in trouble if our thinkers can't feel and feelers can't think.

Highlights (44)

leisure in Greek is skole, and in Latin scola, the English “school”. The word used to designate the place where we educate and teach is derived from a word which means “leisure”. “School” does not, properly speaking, mean school, but leisure.

Location 154

in order to gain a clear notion of leisure we must begin by setting aside the prejudice—our prejudice—that comes from overvaluing the sphere of work. In his well-known study of capitalism Max Weber1 quotes the saying, that “one does not work to live; one lives to work”, which nowadays no one has much difficulty in understanding: it expresses the current opinion. We even find some difficulty in grasping that it reverses the order of things and stands them on their head.

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The context of Aristotle’s words, and his other statement (in the Politics) to the effect that leisure is the center-point about which everything revolves,3 seems to indicate that he was saying something almost self-evident; and one can only suppose that the Greeks would not have understood our maxims about “work for work’s sake” at all. On the other hand it must be evident that we no longer understand their conception of leisure simply and directly.

Location 169

the Christian and Western conception of the contemplative life is closely linked to the Aristotelian notion of leisure. It is also to be observed that this is the source of the distinction between the artes liberales and the artes serviles, the liberal arts and servile work. And to the further objection that this distinction only interests historians, one might reply that everyone is familiar with at any rate one half of the distinction, from the fact that we still speak of “servile work” as unsuitable on Sundays and holidays. Though who nowadays stops to think that “servile work” and “liberal arts” are twin expressions, and form, one might almost say, the articulation of a joint, so that the one is hardly intelligible without the other? For it is barely possible to think of “servile work” with any degree of accuracy without delimiting the sense with reference to the “liberal arts”.

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The tremendous difference of point of view implied and our relative ignorance of the notion of leisure emerge more clearly if we examine the notion of work in its modern form, spreading, as it does, to cover and include the whole of human activity and even of human life; for then we shall realize to what an extent we tacitly acknowledge the claims that are made in the name of the “worker”.

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On the contrary, “worker” will be used in an anthropological sense; it implies a whole conception of “man”. Ernst Niekisch was using the word “worker” in this sense when he spoke of the “worker” as an “imperial figure”;4 and Ernst Jünger5 uses the same term to outline the ideal image that, according to him, has already begun to mold the man of the future.

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Intellectual activity used always to be considered a privileged sphere, and from the standpoint of the manual worker especially, appeared to be a sphere in which one did not need to work. Within that sphere, the province of philosophy and of philosophical culture seemed furthest from the world of work. But nowadays the whole field of intellectual activity, not excepting the province of philosophical culture, has been overwhelmed by the modern ideal of work and is at the mercy of its totalitarian claims.

Note: Not a realistic thing for mass interest; rich or mad “Knowledge work” [e]

Location 200

Kant, for example, held knowledge to be exclusively “discursive”: that is to say, the opposite of intuitive. “The reason cannot intuit anything.”2 His opinion on this point has quite recently been called “the most momentous dogmatic assumption of Kantian epistemology.”3 According to Kant man’s knowledge is realized in the act of comparing, examining, relating, distinguishing, abstracting, deducing, demonstrating—all of which are forms of active intellectual effort. Knowledge, man’s spiritual, intellectual knowledge (such is Kant’s thesis) is activity, exclusively activity.

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Kant was bound to reach the view that knowing and philosophizing (philosophizing in particular, since it is furthest removed from purely physical awareness) must be regarded and understood as work. And lest there should be any doubt on the point he said so explicitly in an article written in 1796, against the romantic, contemplative and intuitive philosophy of Jacobi, Schlosser and Stolberg.

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The philosophers of antiquity thought otherwise on this matter—though of course their view is very far from offering grounds of justification for those who take the easy path. The Greeks—Aristotle no less than Plato—as well as the great medieval thinkers, held that not only physical, sensuous perception, but equally man’s spiritual and intellectual knowledge, included an element of pure, receptive contemplation, or as Heraclitus says, of “listening to the essence of things”.5

Location 234

Ratio is the power of discursive, logical thought, of searching and of examination, of abstraction, of definition and drawing conclusions. Intellectus, on the other hand, is the name for the understanding in so far as it is the capacity of simplex intuitus, of that simple vision to which truth offers itself like a landscape to the eye. The faculty of mind, man’s knowledge, is both these things in one, according to antiquity and the Middle Ages, simultaneously ratio and intellectus; and the process of knowing is the action of the two together. The mode of discursive thought is accompanied and impregnated by an effortless awareness, the contemplative vision of the intellectus, which is not active but passive, or rather receptive, the activity of the soul in which it conceives that which it sees.

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“Although the knowledge which is most characteristic of the human soul occurs in the mode of ratio, nevertheless there is in it a sort of participation in the simple knowledge which is proper to higher beings, of whom it is therefore said that they possess the faculty of spiritual vision.” That is how the matter is put by Aquinas in the Quaestiones disputate de veritate.6 It means to say that man participates in the angelic faculty of non-discursive vision, which is the capacity to apprehend the spiritual in the same manner that our eye apprehends light or our ear sound. Our knowledge in fact includes an element of non-activity, of purely receptive vision—though it is certainly not essentially human; it is, rather, the fulfillment of the highest promise in man, and thus, again, truly human (just as Aquinas calls the vita contemplativa “non proprie humana, sed superhumana”,7 not really human but superhuman, although it is the noblest mode of human life).

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Look at the “worker” and you will see that his face is marked by strain and tension, and these are even more pronounced in the case of the “intellectual worker”. These are the marks of that perpetual activity (exclusive of all else) of which Goethe remarked that “it ends in bankruptcy”.9 They are the revealing marks of the intellectual sclerosis that comes with not being able to receive or accept, of that hardening of the heart that refuses to suffer anything; and in their extreme form such tensions become vocal in the lunatic assertion “every action has some meaning, even a crime; but to be passive is always senseless.”10

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In Kant’s view, indeed, the fact that man’s natural bent is contrary to the moral law, belongs to the concept of moral law. It is normal and essential, on this view, that the good should be difficult, and that the effort of will required in forcing oneself to perform some action should become the yardstick of the moral good: the more difficult a thing, the higher it is in the order of goodness.

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Hard work, then, is what is good. That is not by any means a new view, and it was put forward by Antisthenes the Cynic,13 one of Plato’s companions among those who grouped themselves round Socrates. Antisthenes is one of those surprisingly modern figures that occur here and there, and it is he who left us the first sketch of the “worker”, or more accurately, perhaps, who represents that figure. Antisthenes is not only the author of the phrase just quoted about hard work; he is also responsible for making Hercules the human ideal, because he performed superhuman labors:14 an ideal that has retained (or has it reacquired it?) a certain force from the days of Erasmus 15 and Kant—who labeled philosophy with the heroic term “herculean”—down to those of Carlyle, the prophet of the religion of work: 16 You must work like Hercules. . . . Antisthenes the Cynic was a self-sufficient moralist, an autarchist, with no sense whatsoever of divine worship, even cracking Voltairian jokes about it;17 he was insensible to the Muses and only liked poetry when it served to express moral truths;18 and as for Eros, it evoked no reply in his heart: “Best of all”, he remarked, “I would like to exterminate Aphrodite.”19 A dry realist, he did not, of course, believe in immortality; the one thing that matters is to live “an upright life” in this world.20 It really looks as though all these traits had been gathered into one for the sake of providing an example in the abstract of the type “worker” pure and undefiled.

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In the Summa Theologica we find St. Thomas propounding a contrary opinion: “The essence of virtue consists in the good rather than in the difficult.”21 “Not everything that is more difficult is necessarily more meritorious; it must be more difficult in such a way that it is at the same time good in a yet higher way.”

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Aquinas says is that virtue makes us perfect by enabling us to follow our natural bent in the right way.23 In fact, he says, the sublime achievements of moral goodness are characterized by effortlessness—because it is of their essence to spring from love.

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Moreover, just as the highest form of virtue knows nothing of “difficulty”, so too the highest form of knowledge comes to man like a gift—the sudden illumination, a stroke of genius, true contemplation; it comes effortlessly and without trouble. On one occasion St. Thomas speaks of contemplation and play in the same breath: “because of the leisure that goes with contemplation” the divine wisdom itself, Holy Scripture says, is “always at play, playing through the whole world”(Prov 8:30f.).25

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This aspect too of “intellectual work”—the exaggerated value which is put upon the “difficult” simply because it is difficult—becomes evident in the accentuation of a particular trait in the look of the “worker”: the fixed, mask-like readiness to suffer in vacuo, without relation to anything. It is the absence of any connection with reality or real values that is distinctive. And it is because this readiness to suffer (which has been called the heart of discipline, of whatever kind) 26 never asks the question “to what end” that it is utterly different from the Christian conception of sacrifice. The Christian conception of sacrifice is not concerned with the suffering involved qua suffering, it is not primarily concerned with the toil and the worry and with the difficulty, but with salvation, with the fullness of being, and thus ultimately with the fullness of happiness: “The end and the norm of discipline is happiness.”27

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man seems to mistrust everything that is effortless; he can only enjoy, with a good conscience, what he has acquired with toil and trouble; he refuses to have anything as a gift.

Location 342

the Christian understanding of life depends upon the existence of “Grace”; let us recall that the Holy Spirit of God is himself called a “gift”28 in a special sense; that the great teachers of Christianity say that the premise of God’s justice is his love;29 that everything gained and everything claimed follows upon something given, and comes after something gratuitous and unearned;

Location 343

is really meant is roughly this: like the wage-earner, the manual worker and the proletarian, the educated man, the scholar, too, is a worker, in fact an “intellectual worker”, and he, too, is harnessed to the social system and takes his place in the division of labor; he is allotted his place and his function among the workers; he is a functionary in the world of “total work”; he may be called a specialist, but he is a functionary. And that is what brings out the problem which really lies behind our question, in all its colors. That problem, it need hardly be said, is not just a theoretical one; it is the root problem with which we began our discussion: are we to build our house in the European tradition?

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What are the liberal arts? In his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Aquinas gives this definition: “Only those arts are called liberal or free which are concerned with knowledge; those which are concerned with utilitarian ends that are attained through activity, however, are called servile.”30 “I know well”, Newman says, “that knowledge may resolve itself into an art, and seminate in a mechanical process and in tangible fruit; but it may also fall back upon that Reason, which informs it, and resolve itself into Philosophy. For in one case it is called Useful Knowledge, in the other Liberal.”31 The liberal arts, then, include all forms of human activity which are an end in themselves; the servile arts are those which have an end beyond themselves, and more precisely an end which consists in a utilitarian result attainable in practice, a practicable result.

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Is there a sphere of human activity, one might even say of human existence, that does not need to be justified by inclusion in a five-year plan and its technical organization? Is there such a thing, or not? The inner meaning of the concepts “intellectual work” and “intellectual worker” points to the answer “No.” Man, from this point of view, is essentially a functionary, an official, even in the highest reaches of his activity.

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When, therefore, we discuss the place and justification of philosophy we are discussing no more nor less than the place and justification of the university, of academic education itself in the true sense—that is, the sense in which it differs fundamentally from mere professional training and goes beyond such training in principle. A functionary is trained. Training is defined as being concerned with some one side or aspect of man, with regard to some special subject. Education concerns the whole man; an educated man is a man with a point of view from which he takes in the whole world. Education concerns the whole man, man capax universi, capable of grasping the totality of existing things.

Location 385

can a full human existence be contained within an exclusively workaday existence?

Location 393

worker’s world, as Ernst Jünger puts it, is “the denial of free scholarship and inquiry.”34 In a consistently planned “worker” State there is no room for philosophy because philosophy cannot serve other ends than its own or it ceases to be philosophy; nor can the sciences be carried on in a philosophical manner, which means to say that there can be no such thing as university (academic) education in the full sense of the word. And it is above all the expression “intellectual worker” that epigrammatically confirms the fact that this is impossible. And that is why it is so alarmingly symptomatic that ordinary usage, and even university custom, allows the term “intellectual worker” and sometimes permits “brain worker”.

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“I have never bothered or asked”, Goethe said to Friedrich Soret in 1830, “in what way I was useful to society as a whole; I contented myself with expressing what I recognized as good and true. That has certainly been useful in a wide circle; but that was not the aim; it was the necessary result.”35

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“It is necessary for the perfection of human society”, Aquinas writes, “that there should be men who devote their lives to contemplation”36—nota bene, necessary not only for the good of the individual who so devotes himself, but for the good of human society. No one thinking in terms of “intellectual worker” could have said that.

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The “worker”, it has been seen in our brief analysis of that significant figure, is characterized by three principal traits: an extreme tension of the powers of action, a readiness to suffer in vacuo unrelated to anything, and complete absorption in the social organism, itself rationally planned to utilitarian ends. Leisure, from this point of view, appears as something wholly fortuitous and strange, without rhyme or reason, and, morally speaking, unseemly: another word for laziness, idleness and sloth. At the zenith of the Middle Ages, on the contrary, it was held that sloth and restlessness, “leisurelessness”, the incapacity to enjoy leisure, were all closely connected; sloth was held to be the source of restlessness, and the ultimate cause of “work for work’s sake”.

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In the first place acedia does not signify the “idleness” we envisage when we speak of idleness as “the root of all vice”. Idleness, in the medieval view, means that a man renounces the claim implicit in his human dignity. In a word, he does not want to be as God wants him to be, and that ultimately means that he does not wish to be what he really, fundamentally, is. Acedia is the “despair from weakness” which Kierkegaard analyzed as the “despairing refusal to be oneself”.2 Metaphysically and theologically, the notion of acedia means that a man does not, in the last resort, give the consent of his will to his own being; that beneath the dynamic activity of his existence, he is still not at one with himself; that, as the Middle Ages expressed it, sadness overwhelms him when he is confronted with the divine goodness immanent in himself(that

Note: Not simply laziness, but a distance, alienation, and melancholy between the self capitalism/technlogy shapwa you into and the less xonstrained self. Its a refusal of the wise self, a passing on enlightenmet to deal with trifles.

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No, the contrary of acedia is not the spirit of work in the sense of the work of every day, of earning one’s living; it is man’s happy and cheerful affirmation of his own being, his acquiescence in the world and in God—which is to say love. Love that certainly brings a particular freshness and readiness to work along with it, but that no one with the least experience could conceivably confuse with the tense activity of the fanatical “worker”.

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Acedia was reckoned among the vitia capitalia, as one of the seven capital or cardinal sins, for they were not called “capital” because of the best-known rendering of caput; caput certainly means “head”, but it also means “source” or “spring”—and that is the meaning in this case. They are sins from which other faults follow “naturally”, one is tempted to say, as from a source. Idleness—and this is how we get back to the question—idleness, according to traditional teaching, is the source of many faults and among others of that deep-seated lack of calm which makes leisure impossible. Among other faults, certainly, and one of the children of acedia, is despair, which amounts to saying that despair and the incapacity for leisure are twins—a revealing thought that explains, among other things, the hidden meaning of that very questionable saying, “work and don’t despair.”

Note: compare this woth montaigne's idelness

Location 445

Leisure, it must be clearly understood, is a mental and spiritual attitude—it is not simply the result of external factors, it is not the inevitable result of spare time, a holiday, a weekend or a vacation. It is, in the first place, an attitude of mind, a condition of the soul, and as such utterly contrary to the ideal of “worker” in each and every one of the three aspects under which it was analyzed: work as activity, as toil, as a social function. Compared with the exclusive ideal of work as activity, leisure implies (in the first place) an attitude of non-activity, of inward calm, of silence; it means not being “busy”, but letting things happen. Leisure is a form of silence, of that silence which is the prerequisite of the apprehension of reality: only the silent hear and those who do not remain silent do not hear. Silence, as it is used in this context, does not mean “dumbness” or “noiselessness”; it means more nearly that the soul’s power to “answer” to the reality of the world is left undisturbed. For leisure is a receptive attitude of mind, a contemplative attitude, and it is not only the occasion but also the capacity for steeping oneself in the whole of creation. Furthermore, there is also a certain serenity in leisure. That serenity springs precisely from our inability to understand, from our recognition of the mysterious nature of the universe; it springs from the courage of deep confidence, so that we are content to let things take their course; and there is something about it which Konrad Weiss, the poet, called “confidence in the fragmentariness of life and history.”

Note: an obligation to not be busy; an obligation towards open writing, not content

Location 455

Leisure is not the attitude of mind of those who actively intervene, but of those who are open to everything; not of those who grab and grab hold, but of those who leave the reins loose and who are free and easy themselves—almost like a man falling asleep, for one can only fall asleep by “letting oneself go”.

Note: undirected play

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It is in these silent and receptive moments that the soul of man is sometimes visited by an awareness of what holds the world together:                was die Welt      Im innersten zusarnmenhalt only for a moment perhaps, and the lightning vision of his intuition has to be recaptured and rediscovered in hard work.

Note: yin yang; leisure births insight to pursue aligned work

Location 478

Leisure is possible only on the premise that man consents to his own true nature and abides in concord with the meaning of the universe

Note: aligning your time with your cosmic model of existence

Location 483

Leisure draws its vitality from affirmation.

Location 485

And we may read in the first chapter of Genesis that God “ended his work which he had made” and “behold, it was very good.” In leisure, man too celebrates the end of his work by allowing his inner eye to dwell for a while upon the reality of the Creation.

Note: all work should be done with cosmology in mind

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Now the highest form of affirmation is the festival; among its characteristics, Karl Kerényi tells us, is “the union of tranquility, contemplation, and intensity of life.” 12 To hold a celebration means to affirm the basic meaningfulness of the universe and a sense of oneness with it, of inclusion within it. In celebrating, in holding festivals upon occasion, man experiences the world in an aspect other than the everyday one.

Note: tie to baptism

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A break in one’s work, whether of an hour, a day or a week, is still part of the world of work. It is a link in the chain of utilitarian functions. The pause is made for the sake of work and in order to work, and a man is not only refreshed from work but for work. Leisure is an altogether different matter; it is no longer on the same plane; it runs at right angles to work—just

Note: how t make time for leisure in a busy life

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Thus, however true it may be that the man who says his nightly prayers sleeps the better for it, nevertheless no one could say his nightly prayers with that in mind.

Note: nightly prayer...

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Because Wholeness is what man strives for, the power to achieve leisure is one of the fundamental powers of the human soul. Like the gift for contemplative absorption in the things that are, and like the capacity of the spirit to soar in festive celebration, the power to know leisure is the power to overstep the boundaries of the workaday world and reach out to superhuman, life-giving existential forces that refresh and renew us before we turn back to our daily work. Only in genuine leisure does a “gate to freedom” open. Through that gate man may escape from the “restricted area” of that “latent anxiety” which a keen observer has perceived to be the mark of the world of work, where “work and unemployment are the two inescapable poles of existence.”15

Note: build a life that enbles leisure

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Aristotle says of leisure, “A man will live thus, not to the extent that he is a man, but to the extent that a divine principle dwells within him.”16

Location 523